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Science Communication

On the Problem and Promise of Metaphor Use in Science
and Science Communication
Cynthia Taylor* and Bryan M. Dewsbury
Department of Biological Sciences, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881
The language of science is largely metaphorical. Scientists rely on metaphor and analogy to make sense of
scientific phenomena and communicate their findings to each other and to the public. Yet, despite their
utility, metaphors can also constrain scientific reasoning, contribute to public misunderstandings, and, at
times, inadvertently reinforce stereotypes and messages that undermine the goals of inclusive science. This
paper 1) examines the generative potential of metaphors to the advancement of scientific knowledge and
science communication, 2) highlights the ways in which outdated metaphors may limit scientific inquiry
and contribute to public misunderstandings, and 3) critically analyzes the implications of cryptic social and
political messages embedded in common metaphors in the life sciences.

INTRODUCTION
Metaphors are pervasive in the language of science.
Scientists regularly engage in analogical reasoning to develop
hypotheses and interpret results, and they rely heavily on
metaphors to communicate observations and findings (1). In
turn, nonexperts make sense of, and contextualize, abstract
ideas and new knowledge through the use of metaphors.
While indispensable heuristic tools for doing, communicating, and understanding science, metaphors can also impede
scientific inquiry, reinforce public misunderstandings, and
perpetuate unintended social and political messages (2). For
these reasons, it is especially important for scientists, science
communicators, and science educators to acknowledge the
conceptual, social, and political dimensions of metaphors in
science and adopt critical perspectives on their use and effects.
The role of metaphor in scientific thought and communication has been widely considered by philosophers,
rhetoricians, and science communication and public understanding of science scholars (2–7). Yet it seems that much
of the preeminent work on metaphor in science is still
unbeknownst to many scientists, who might benefit from
the interdisciplinary insights this body of literature has to
offer. This paper draws from several notable publications to
highlight the importance of metaphors to scientific reasoning
and science communication in the hope of sparking broader
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interest in, and concern for, the implications of metaphors
in the life sciences. Following the tradition of critical studies
of science (8–11), we open up the language of science to
scrutiny and treat metaphors not just as heuristic and rhetorical devices, but also as social and political "messengers"
(2) rooted in cultural dynamics and power relations.
The term metaphor can be traced to the Greek word
metaphora, which is derived from meta (meaning “over”)
and pherein (meaning “to carry”) (12). As I. A. Richards
(13) explains, a metaphor is a comparison between two
seemingly dissimilar concepts that involves the “carrying
over of a word from its normal use to a new use” (p. 221).
Metaphors are crucial in the production of knowledge in
that they allow us to make concrete connections between
abstract concepts and everyday experiences. A growing
body of literature also suggests that metaphors shape the
mind, structure our experiences, and influence behavior
(14–17). Experimental studies reveal that changes in the
framing of policy-relevant issues (such as crime, natural disasters, and climate change) through metaphors can subtly,
and covertly, influence the perception of risk, the sense of
urgency, and the level of support for proposed “solutions”
by acting on pre-existing cognitive schemas and prompting
affective responses (15, 18–20).
Lakoff and Johnson’s (14) theory of conceptual metaphor posits that the nature of human cognition is metaphorical, and that all knowledge emerges as a result of embodied
physical and social experiences. Under this view, metaphors
are not mere linguistic embellishments. Rather, they are
foundations for thought processes and conceptual understandings that function to map meaning from one knowledge
and/or perceptual domain to another. When attempting to
make sense of abstract, intangible phenomena, we draw
from embodied experiences and look to concrete entities

©2018 Author(s). Published by the American Society for Microbiology. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ and https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode), which grants the public the nonexclusive right to copy, distribute, or display the published work.

Volume 19, Number 1

Journal of Microbiology & Biology Education
Downloaded from www.asmscience.org by
IP: 74.97.25.81
On: Fri, 09 Oct 2020 19:21:11

1

TAYLOR & DEWSBURY: METAPHOR IN SCIENCE COMMUNICATION

to serve as cognitive representatives. For example, in the
classic trope, “time is money,” our understanding of money,
as well as meanings we ascribe to it, are mapped onto a target domain—time. The choice of money as a source domain
here is influenced by perceived attribute similarities between
it and the target domain concept (time). Subsequently, this
linkage between money and time structures our experience
with time, in that we conceptualize it as a form of currency
that can be spent, invested, valued, and/or wasted (14).
Embodied cognition perspectives shed light on the
imperative of metaphor in scientific thought and communication. Conceptual frameworks and theoretical models in science are rooted in the same embodied understandings of the
world as those unconsciously employed in other day-to-day
physical and social interactions (6). Scientific reasoning, then,
is situated in what Gerhard Vollmer (21) refers to as the
mesocosm, or the “section of the real world we cope with
in perceiving and acting, sensually and motorically” (p. 89).
Building on Vollmer’s work (as well as Lakoff and Johnson’s
conceptual metaphor theory), Niebert and Gropengießer
(17) argue that, because the human perceptual system is
not well suited to interpreting macrocosmic (e.g., the biosphere, solar systems, galaxies) and microcosmic (e.g., cells,
molecules, atoms) phenomena, scientists regularly turn to
metaphors, grounded in mesocosmic experiences, to make
sense of observations and communicate ideas. They explain:
Consider the following constructs where scientists make
use of everyday experience to explain their theories.
Robert Hooke was the first to denote the cell using the
term “cell” when an image of a piece of cork under his
microscope reminded him of the small rooms, or cells,
occupied by monks in monasteries. Kepler developed
his concept of planetary motion by comparison with a
clock. Huygens used water waves to theorise that light
is wavelike. Arrhenius described the greenhouse effect
by referring to his experience with hot pots. In ever new
variations, scientists employ experiences from everyday
life to understand scientific phenomena. (17, p. 2)
Though the use of metaphorical language in science has
been historically criticized by some philosophers of science
and scientists on the grounds that metaphors are figurative,
ambiguous, and imprecise, their generative potential cannot be ignored. It is, in fact, metaphor that makes theory
possible, and a great number of scientific revolutions have
been initiated through novel comparisons between natural
phenomena and everyday experiences (3).
Limitations of metaphors in science communication
Metaphors in biology and ecology are so ubiquitous that
we have to some extent become blind to their existence.
We are inundated with metaphorical language, such as genetic “blueprints,” ecological “footprints,” “invasive” species,
“agents” of infectious disease, “superbugs,” “food chains,”
2

“missing links,” and so on. While we may not be able to conceptualize, or communicate, abstract scientific phenomena
without employing such metaphors, we must also recognize
their limitations, as well as their potential to constrain interpretations of natural processes. In many ways, the metaphors
we rely upon may uphold and reinforce outdated scientific
paradigms, contributing to public misunderstandings about
complex scientific issues.
Take for example the concept of genes as “blueprints,”
which has guided research in molecular biology for decades
(for recent examples of blueprint metaphors in molecular
biology publications, see 22–24). Critics argue that conceptualizing the genome as a blueprint (or variations such
as codes or instructions) is deterministic, oversimplifies
complex gene-gene and gene-environment interactions
(10, 25), and is, in many ways, incompatible with recent
advancements in the fields of developmental biology and
epigenetics (26). If genes really do function as blueprints,
we should expect a one-to-one correspondence between
particular genetic “instructions” and phenotypic outcomes
in organisms, with limited input from the environment in
structuring variation between individuals. Yet this is not
the case. Often, single genes can, and do, direct multiple
phenotypic outcomes through epigenetic processes that
are responsive to the environment. This concept of variable phenotypic responses to environmental conditions, or
plasticity, has become an increasingly important framework
for understanding not only how organisms develop, but
also the role of genes in initiating evolutionary change. Our
metaphors, however, have not kept up with recent advances
in scientific understandings. Accordingly, this has led some
biologists to reject the blueprint metaphor and offer up new
ways of conceptualizing the nature of genes (26).
Barbara Katz Rothman (25) suggests that envisioning
genes as “recipes” is more accurate in that it allows for the
incorporation of time, growth and development, and the importance of the environment on the “final product.” She writes,
A recipe might make more sense as an analogy. Take
bread baking, which combines making something with
growth, the growth of the yeast that gives bread its
rise. The same recipe under different circumstances
gives you different breads. Use a flour from a wheat
grown in one part of the country and you have a different mineral composition than that from flour grown
somewhere else. Bake on a humid day and you get a
heavier bread than you would on a dry day. Bake on
a hot day and it rises faster and has bigger airholes.
Bake the same recipe every day for a week, and no two
loaves will be exactly the same: the web, that distinctive pattern of holes, will vary from loaf to loaf. Bake it
in different pans or in different ovens and you’ll have
differently textured crusts. (25, p. 33)
While the recipe metaphor is useful in that it provides
new ways of envisioning gene-environment interactions, it
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is not without problems. Some critics point out that it differs little from that of the blueprint metaphor, other than
appealing to different personal experiences and triggering
different gendered associations (27). Moreover, both recipes
and blueprints are essentially a static “set of directions for
producing a tangible material product” (28 p. 33) and may
be equally constraining when it comes to conceptualizing
what genes are and what they do. Survey, interview, and
focus-group data collected by Condit et al. (27) indicate
that genetic metaphors activate diverse, context-dependent
meanings (as well as varying degrees of deterministic connotations) amongst different audiences, and they highlight
the need for more empirically-grounded research in critical
discussions of metaphor use in the life sciences.
Metaphors as sociopolitical messengers
In the United States, many of the metaphors we use to
talk about topics in biology and ecology are competitive and
militaristic (e.g., evolutionary “arms-races,” cells being “hijacked” by viruses), and/or technology driven (e.g., the brain
as “computer,” body as “machine,” cells as “factories”). Our
choice of words not only reflects deep cultural cosmologies
and historical influences (2) but also reinforces cultural norms,
ideologies, and beliefs. Though metaphors are indispensable
tools for communicating science, they are sometimes misleading to the general public and can be easily exploited in
attempts to further social and political agendas (26).
Since the 17th century, mechanical metaphors have
been used extensively by scientists to make sense of nature (26). Part of the appeal of the machine-based analogies that emerged during the Scientific Revolution resided
in their perceived compatibility with religious beliefs. As
Pigliucci and Boundry explain, “the mechanical pictures of
living organisms and the cosmos at large converged into
an intellectual tradition where theology and science were
intimately intertwined” (26, p. 455). Machine metaphors
allowed for religious speculation and inferred an inescapable conclusion: that a designer or creator must exist (for
all machines have a maker). Though the vast majority of
working scientists today reject design as an explanation for
scientific processes, they nonetheless still rely on mechanical
metaphors to understand (and communicate) the natural
world. As a result, science education is rife with machinebased explanations and imagery that may inadvertently
foster teleological thinking in students and the public. The
intelligent design movement has exploited scientists’ use
of machine metaphors and continues to employ machine
analogies as powerful persuasive tools (26).
The “war on invasive species” is another example that
demonstrates how certain sociopolitical ideologies become
entangled with scientific discourse. Militaristic metaphors
are abundant not just in popular articles on invasive species,
but also in the scientific literature (2). Despite debates over
what constitutes an invasive vs. a native species (as well as
disagreements over whether or not species that spread
Volume 19, Number 1

rapidly are any more damaging than species with limited
ranges), the language of invasion biology incites fear and
encourages action. Invasion metaphors are performative
in the sense that they encourage “weed pulls and control
programs, the erection of barrier zones, lucrative contracts
for herbicide companies, and research grants for invasion
biologists” (2, p. 175). Such metaphors also blur “facts” with
“values,” reflecting—and reinforcing—nationalistic concerns
regarding invasion and immigration, xenophobia, and commitment to militaristic responses (2, 29).
Popular metaphors in biology and ecology are also
windows into a culture of science that is deeply rooted in
hegemonic norms and values that are perpetuated through
both the process of scientific inquiry and science communication (30, 31). When metaphor choices are not appropriately vetted with careful social, political, and historical
considerations in mind, they may subtly contribute to the
alienation of individuals and groups. Joan Herbers’ criticism
of entomologists’ use of slavery metaphors (31) to describe
the behavior of ants illuminates this issue. Herbers explains
that, though unintentional, the use of such “racially loaded”
(p. 104) metaphors in contemporary scientific discourse
functions to naturalize human social institutions and unequal
social relations, and is potentially offensive to the many descendants of slaves living in the United States and other parts
of the world today (31). Descriptions of “slave-making” ants
originated during the height of the slave trade of the 1800s
and, despite being a misleading and inaccurate description
of actual ant behavior, continue to be used in popular publications and journal articles (a recent library search by the
authors using ex libris primo identified 44 scholarly articles
published between 2012 and 2017 that made reference to
slave-making ants). Equally as problematic is the persistent
use of other anthropomorphic analogies (harems, castes,
colonies, etc.) in the life sciences to describe non-human
social relations. Such analogies inadvertently legitimize
systems of dominance and hierarchy, reproduce racial and
gendered stereotypes, and may perpetuate dehumanizing colonial representations of historically subjugated groups (32).
Remnants of colonialism also echo within scientific
discourses through the use of metaphors that equate the
practice of science itself with penetrating the unknown,
conquering nature, and pioneering new frontiers (30, 33).
Many science-related metaphors harbor traditionally masculine values and may activate implicit associations between
science, gender, and/or race, thus reinforcing dominant
stereotypes about who does science. This is especially worrisome given that recent studies involving primary, secondary, and undergraduate students indicate that stereotypes
of scientists as “white” and “male” continue to persist and
negatively impact the science aspirations of students from
underrepresented groups (34–36).
In light of these observations, some scholars have attempted to generate new metaphors that are more inclusive and less alienating to individuals whose identities and
experiences do not align with perceptions of the culture
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of science. Flannery (30), for example, offers “quilting” as
an alternative metaphor for scientific research that directs
attention to similarities in the skills and processes employed
by both scientists and artisans (creativity, collaboration, painstaking attention to detail, the cultivation of tacit knowledge,
etc.). She argues that if the metaphors we used to talk about
science acknowledged the communal, craft-like aspects of
scientific endeavors, we might imagine the process of science
in productive new ways that are less alienating to traditionally
marginalized groups. Like all metaphors, however, Flannery’s
is not without problems and limitations. Some readers will
undoubtedly object to this metaphor on the grounds that it
is exclusionary in its own right (to individuals and groups who
are unfamiliar with, and/or uninterested in, quilt-making traditions), and that it obscures the important fact that the final
outcomes of scientific research are unknown (as opposed to
the predetermined products of quilting). Nevertheless, Flannery’s considerations provide opportunities to envision how
novel metaphors might emphasize different ways of doing science and broaden (or narrow) its appeal to underrepresented
groups. Much more research is still needed in examining the
role of science-related metaphors in activating stereotypical
representations of how science is done, and by whom.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
For all of their problems, metaphors are indispensable
tools for both practicing and communicating science. No
metaphor is perfect, and incongruities between target and
source meanings are unavoidable. Some metaphors, however, may be more (or less) constraining when it comes to
conceptualizing complex scientific issues. Careful consideration must be paid not only to the ways in which metaphors may contribute to public misunderstanding, but also
to how their use may unintentionally reinforce particular
social and political messages that undermine the goals of
inclusive science. More interdisciplinary collaborations between scholars in the life sciences, social sciences, and the
humanities might be helpful in cultivating new metaphors
that better align with contemporary values and goals of the
scientific community at large and are more salient, more
familiar, and less offensive to underrepresented groups. Additionally, more attention could be paid to helping students
develop the skills and competencies needed for identifying
metaphors, assessing their strengths and limitations in conceptualizing abstract ideas, and unpacking their more subtle
social and political messages. We suspect that educational
activities involving the dissection of metaphors in the science classroom might help move students toward deeper
understandings of scientific concepts and help foster greater
concern for, and commitment to, civic responsibilities among
future scientists.
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